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Abstract
The optimal organizational form and optimal incentive contract are character-
ized for a team of money managers, assuming that the investor (principal) is risk
averse and that each manager’s (agent’s) actions aﬀect both that manager’s ex-
pected return and the correlation of returns between managers. If the managers
are risk tolerant, then a noncooperative team organization and a strictly competi-
tive contract, in which each manager is rewarded both for doing well and for doing
better than the team, is the most eﬃcient way to discourage herding within the
team. This is despite the fact that, in such a contract total wages paid are a
concave function of total returns, and so using the contract to discourage herding
(and thus achieve lower risk) is in direct conﬂict with the investor’s objective of
using the contract to transfer risk onto the managers. As the risk aversion of both
the investor and the managers increases, cooperation among managers becomes
the optimal way to organize the team. For some parameter values, if everyone is
risk averse, ﬁrst-best can be achieved under cooperation. First-best without herd-
ing can never be achieved if the managers are risk tolerant, or if cooperation is
infeasible.
Keywords: money managers, moral hazard, limited liability
JEL codes: G23, C72, D82, L23, G111I n troduction
This paper examines the portfolio management problem from the perspective of moral haz-
ard in teams. As argued by Sharpe (1981) and Barry and Starks (1984), an investor may
optimally prefer that her money be managed by a team of managers rather than a single
manager. Sharpe’s argument was based on two points. First, diﬀerent managers may have
expertise in diﬀerent styles of investing or diﬀerent assets. Second, there is a diversiﬁcation
beneﬁt in that any single manager may make a serious error.1 Barry and Starks (1984)
argued that risk sharing concerns provide a further reason for employing multiple money
mangers. In support of this argument Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1992) in
a study of pension funds pointed out that: “Some plans manage their money internally,
but more commonly they hire several money managers and split the pension plan’s money
among them.”
In order for a risk averse investor, who prefers both higher expected returns and lower
risk, to take advantage of employing multiple money managers these managers must diver-
sify in their eﬀorts. That is, they must have incentives not to herd. One method to ensure
diversiﬁcation might be to simply employ multiple information gatherers and a single man-
ager, rather than multiple managers. However, as pointed out by Sharpe (1981), this may
not work because those who gather the information may wish to control its use and because
it may be diﬃcult to attribute value to individual pieces of information.
Alternatively, the investor may simply divide her money among multiple managers who
advertise diﬀerent investment styles. While this will achieve some diversiﬁcation objectives,
it requires a level of management on the part of the investor herself that may go well beyond
what she is willing and able to exert. For example, there are many dimensions to investment
styles and much room for individual judgement when assigning potential investments to
particular styles. In addition, it may be very diﬃcult, if not impossible for an investor to
observe whether a manager is engaging in the stated style of investment. Musto (1999), for
example, provides evidence that money fund managers engage in “window dressing” with the
1American Funds at their website (www.americanfunds.com) posts the following argument for managing their funds with
teams: “Because each investment professional oﬀers unique expertise and acts on diﬀerent convictions, this approach furthers
the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation.”
1purpose of misrepresenting the risk of their holdings at the time of disclosure. The nature
of money management is such that trading can occur easily and frequently. Thus, in order
for an investor to truly know what a manager is doing, the investor would need to monitor
the portfolio on a constant basis, or at the very least on a frequent and random basis. The
problem is that such intense monitoring is likely to be costly. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler
and Vishny (1992) argue that while pension fund managers can monitor frequently, any in
depth monitoring of the portfolio composition is apt to occur only at the year end, rather
than throughout the year.
The objective of this paper is to propose a method for employing multiple money managers
that provides them with incentives to diversify, and does not require direct monitoring of the
compositions of their portfolios. The proposals put forth in this paper involve two parts: the
optimal organizational form of the team and the optimal contract between the investor and
managers. In terms of organizational form I will consider a “noncooperative” form in which
managers are not able to monitor each other or sign side contracts and a “cooperative” form
in which they can monitor and enter into side contracts. Within each form I will determine
the optimal contract, as a function of the parameters, and then will determine the optimal
organizational form. The contracts proposed in this paper require only that the returns of
individual managers, and in some cases only that the total return of the team of managers,
be observed. In order to determine these optimal contracts I design a model of moral hazard
in teams in which the correlation between individual agents’ outcomes is endogenous. The
contracts proposed always provide suﬃcient incentives for each agent to exert eﬀort in order
to achieve higher expected returns for the investor. In the cases where the investor optimally
prefers the agents to diversify in their eﬀorts (this depends on the investor’s risk attitude),
the contract also provides suﬃcient incentives to encourage this.
A main result of the paper is that the optimal organizational form of the team and the
structure of the optimal wage contract depend on the risk attitudes of both the investor and
the money managers. This makes intuitive sense because diversiﬁcation aﬀects the riskiness
of the total portfolio return. Thus, the most eﬃcient way in which to discourage herding
(encourage diversiﬁcation) will depend very much on the risk attitudes of the managers.
2In addition, the contract between the investor and managers serves not only to provide
incentives for the managers to take particular actions, but also is a vehicle for risk sharing
between the investor and managers. It is for this reason that the investor’s risk attitude also
aﬀects the design of the optimal contract.
If the money managers are relatively risk tolerant, then the most eﬃcient way to provide
incentives for the managers to not herd, is with a strictly competitive contract (and noncoop-
erative organizational form). Under such a contract a manager is rewarded for doing strictly
better than other managers, something that is less likely to occur if that manager herds.
The downside of such a competitive contract is that the total wages paid by the investor are
a concave function of the total returns, and as such, the contract does not optimally transfer
risk to the managers. Thus, when managers are risk tolerant there is a tension between the
objective of providing incentives for the managers to lower the portfolio risk by not herding,
and the objective of transfering risk to the mangers.2 Despite this tension, if diversiﬁcation
across managers is valuable (for decreasing portfolio risk), then the competitive contract will
be optimal when managers are risk tolerant.
Even though competitive contracts do not optimally transfer risk from the investor to
the managers as a group, such contracts do impose risk on individual managers. This is
because the nature of the contract is such that some managers are winners and some are
losers. If the managers are risk averse, then they must be compensated for taking on this
risk, thus adding to the expense of the competitive contract. Fortunately, as the managers
become more risk averse, their incentives with regard to diversiﬁcation can be more easily
aligned with those of the investor. As is shown in the paper, the ﬁrst-best contract calls
for paying wages that are based only on the team performance, not on individual managers’
performances. If the managers are risk averse enough, then this is also second best. In
this case, the cooperative organizational form is optimal and the investor optimally oﬀers
a single team contract, rather than individual competitive contracts. Related to this, it is
also shown that if the managers are risk averse enough, for some parameter values, ﬁrst best
2If the managers are risk tolerant one might consider transferring the risk entirely to them so that the investor receives a
guaranteed return. The problem with this is that it would require the managers in some states to pay out to the investor more
than they earn in their investments. This is not a reasonable assumption for money management, and so I instead make a
limited liability assumption that rules out this solution.
3can be achieved. First best with nonherding cannot be achieved if the managers are risk
tolerant.
In practice, we observe fund companies that are organized on diﬀerent models. Fidelity,
for example, is organized around a “star” system in which each fund has only one manager.
American Funds, on the other hand, uses a team organization for their funds. In terms of
compensation contracts we don’t know how these are structured.3 There is one study, how-
ever, that provides some intriguing related evidence. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examine
career movements of fund managers and their investment behavior. They provide evidence
on the relation between nonherding, success or failure, and termination or promotion. They
ﬁnd that, in terms of the probability of termination, the cost of nonherding (deviating from
other managers) and failing is signiﬁcantly greater than the beneﬁt of nonherding and suc-
ceeding. But, in terms of the probability of promotion the opposite holds: the beneﬁt of
nonherding and succeeding is signiﬁcantly greater than the cost of nonherding and failing.
Putting these two results together, whether a manager wants to herd will depend on the
relative strength of each of these incentives and on the risk attitude of the manager. If the
manager is risk averse enough, then such a reward structure will certainly provide incen-
tives to herd. The results presented in this paper are consistent with this result in that, if
managers are highly risk averse, then a competitive incentive structure does not optimally
discourage herding.
This paper contributes both to the literature on money management and to the moral
hazard in teams literature. Sharpe (1981) and Barry and Starks (1984) provide arguments
for why multiple money managers may be optimal. Barry and Starks (1984) approach this
problem as a moral hazard problem in that they show that providing risk averse money
managers with the proper incentives may be less expensive with multiple managers, than
with a single manager. Starks (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Stoughton (1993),
Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1997) and Dybvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2001) all examine
compensation contracts for single money managers. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) ﬁnd
evidence of risk shifting of money managers, perhaps due to the tournament (competitive)
3Deli (2002) studies contracts between funds and ﬁrms that provide advisory services to the funds. He ﬁnds that 93% of his
sample have advisory contracts based solely on a percent of assets. However, these advisors are not the managers of the funds.
4nature of the money management industry in which money managers are rewarded for doing
better than competitors. None of these papers consider the diversiﬁcation/herding problem
that is modelled here.
Holmstr¨ om (1982) brought the moral hazard in teams problem to the forefront by showing
that when the results of individual agents’ eﬀorts cannot be observed, so that the fruits
of these eﬀorts must be shared with the entire team, then this causes diﬃculties in the
design of the contract. In the model developed here, even though the returns on individual
investments may be observed by the investor, individual contributions to the overall riskiness
of the portfolio cannot be observed. Thus, the moral hazard in teams problem arises with
regard to discouraging herding within the team.
This is not the ﬁrst paper to provide conditions under which a competitive contract is
optimal. However, optimality of a competitive contract arises in this paper for diﬀerent rea-
sons than in earlier literature. Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuﬀ
and Stiglitz (1983), Mookherjee (1984) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) all show that
a competitive contract may be optimal for encouraging eﬀort when individual returns are
highly correlated. Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) and Ramakrishnan
and Thakor (1991) show further that if individual returns are uncorrelated then competition
does not add value. In this paper, however, if the investor optimally wishes to encourage
diversiﬁcation (low correlation among individual returns), then the optimal contract may be
competitive. That is, competition may be an essential element of a contract that discourages
money managers from herding in order to achieve low correlation between their returns.
Of the papers cited above, this paper shares most in common with Ramakrishnan and
Thakor (1991) in that both examine forms of contracts with multiple agents under diﬀerent
assumptions regarding competition or cooperation.4 This paper diﬀers from Ramakrishnan
and Thakor (1991) in two very important dimensions. First, the principal (investor) here is
risk averse while Ramakrishnan and Thakor’s principal is risk neutral. Second, each of the
money managers makes two decisions: whether to herd and whether to exert eﬀort, whereas
in Ramakrishnan and Thakor there are two tasks that may be performed individually or
shared by two agents.
4Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-Castrillo (1993) also consider cooperation, but with a diﬀerent approach.
5Most of the earlier multiple agent literature assumes that the principal is risk neutral.
Two exceptions to this are Barry and Starks (1984) and Stoughton and Zechner (1999).5
The latter paper examines optimal compensation schemes for division managers who can
choose the variance of their divisional investments. They, however, take the correlation
between divisional returns as exogenously given, whereas this paper treats correlation as
endogenous. Also, in their mechanism design problems the wage contract oﬀered by the
principal must satisfy incentive compatibility for the agents on one dimension: either choice
of standard deviation, or truthful revelation of information. In the problem posed here
the wage contract must satisfy incentive compatibility for the agents on two dimensions:
nonherding and eﬀort choice. The extra dimension aﬀects the contract design.6
The following section describes the model. Section 3 provides some groundwork by pre-
senting the optimal contract, given that the investor is risk neutral and does not optimally
discourage herding. The results of the paper are presented in Sections 4 through 6 in which
it is assumed that the investor is risk averse. Section 4 examines the optimal contract with
a noncooperative organizational form. Section 5 examines the optimal contract with a co-
operative organizational form. In Section 6 the diﬀerent types of organizational forms and
contracts are compared. It is this section that presents the main general results of the paper.
All derivations and proofs are in the Appendix. The Appendix also includes a list of variable
deﬁnitions.
2 The Model
The model presented here is a very stylized model of money management. Because solving
for optimal contracts with multiple risk-averse agents can be very diﬃcult, the components
of the model are kept as simple as possible. There is exactly one investor in the model and
two money managers. Each money manager will choose an asset class exactly once, and will
5Stoughton and Zechner do not speciﬁcally refer to their principal as risk averse. However, their principal’s objective function
is decreasing in the variance of total returns across agents.
6There are also a number of related papers that allow agents to aﬀect the distributions of outcomes. Diamond (1998) and
Palomino and Prat (2002) allow a single agent to choose both an eﬀort level and the distribution of the outcome. In Khanna
(1998) there are multiple principal/agent (one principal and one agent) relationships in which the agents choose whether to
herd. In all of these papers the pricinpal and agent are risk neutral.
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not change that choice. As discussed in the introduction, if each manager really only chose
her asset class once, and then stayed with that choice, then the investor could monitor this
choice. The assumption of a one-time choice is made here only in the interest of modelling
tractability. It is assumed in this model that monitoring is infeasible.
Figure 1 presents the timeline. I assume that the organizational form is chosen before time
1a. At time 1a the principal/investor oﬀers a wage contract either individually to each money
manager, or to the team as a whole. Individual contracts may be functions of individual
performance, team performance, or a combination of the two. Each money manager may
accept or reject the contract. It will be assumed that all of the bargaining power lies with
the investor, so a contract oﬀer is a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. As such, a manager will accept
as long as she is not made worse oﬀ by the contract.
After accepting the contract each manager chooses an “asset class” in which to invest.
Before making this choice managers in the team talk with each other, so that they may
coordinate their choices.7 Neither these conversations, nor the subsequent actions taken by
the managers, can be observed by the investor. Under the noncooperative organizational
form, the managers are also unable to monitor each other. Thus, under this organizational
form the communication is “cheap talk”, i.e. “communication ...that is costless but which
nonetheless might be useful in coordinating actions” (Kreps (1990), page 388). Thus, the
agreed upon actions must be self enforcing in that each manager must have no incentives to
deviate from these actions.
Each manager decides, at time 1c, whether to exert eﬀort in order to obtain information
about the possible investments within her asset class. Doing so will increase the expected
return of her investment. The manager then makes an investment. At time 2, returns on
7This is based on the very realistic assumption that money managers do talk to each other, especially if they are in the same
ﬁrm.
7investments are realized. The investor observes neither the asset class nor eﬀort choices, but
can observe individual returns. The wage(s) paid at this time may be individual wages or a
single wage paid to the team, in which case the managers will then divide the wage.
The investor wishes to maximize the following objective function:
E[R − W] − ψvar[R − W] (1)
where R is the total return across the two managers, W is the total wage paid and ψ is an
exogenously given nonnegative constant. This function takes the form of a certainty equiv-
ialent resulting from a negative exponential utility function, with the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion equal to 2ψ: −exp(−2ψ(R − W)), where R − W is Normally distributed. As
described below, the variables here are not assumed to be Normally distributed, so equation
(1) may be viewed simply as a reduced form representation that captures the risk–return
tradeoﬀ.
Each manager wishes to maximize the following:
E[w|x,e] − cx(e) − αvar[w|x,e] (2)
where w is the individual wage, x is an index for the asset class chosen by the manager, e ∈
{0,1} is the level of eﬀort exerted, cx(e)=cost of exerting eﬀort e in class x (cx(0)=0 ,∀x),
and α is an exogenously given nonnegative constant.
The asset classes diﬀer in their costs of exerting eﬀort and in their cross-correlations of
returns. It is assumed that there is a single asset class, asset class one, which has a lower cost
of eﬀort than all other classes. Optimal portfolio diversiﬁcation, however, will require that
the managers invest in diﬀerent classes and that each of these classes be something other
than class one. The assumption of one asset class that is diﬀerent from all other classes is
made largely for reasons of modelling tractability, in that this assumption will make it easier
to write the incentive compatibility constraints. This assumption does not drive the results.
But, it is also not far from reality in that this asset class may be thought of as something
like an index. From this point forward I will say that a manager chooses not to herd when
that manager chooses an asset class other than class 1.
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Figure 2: Probability Trees
• Each manager’s investment return can take on one of two values: 0 or 1. Thus, the
total return R ∈{ 0,1,2}.
• The unconditional distribution on return for each manager’s investment (not condi-
tioned on the other manager’s return) is as follows: If the manager exerts eﬀort (e = 1),
then 1 is realized with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p.I fthe manager does
not exert eﬀort (e = 0), then 1 is realized with probability zero. These probabilities are
identical across asset classes.
• Asset class one has cost of eﬀort = c1. ∀x  =1 ,c x = c2.c 1 <c 2.
cx is the cost that each manager must expend in order to stochastically improve the
expected return of her investments, if she is investing in assets of type x. The per
manager cost of diversiﬁcation is the extra cost of eﬀort, c2 − c1. The idea behind this
is that if a manager does something diﬀerent from other money managers, then she will
need to work a bit harder in order to do well.
• Cross correlation coeﬃcients are deﬁned assuming that all money managers exert eﬀort.
The interaction between these correlation coeﬃcients and eﬀort levels is developed be-
low. If the two managers both invest in asset class one, then the correlation coeﬃcient
of their returns is 1. If they invest in diﬀerent classes, neither of which is class 1, then
the correlation coeﬃcient of their returns is zero: ρyx =0 ,∀x  = y and y,x  =1
If they invest in diﬀerent classes, one of which is class 1, then the correlation coeﬃ-
cient of their returns is: ρ1x = ρ,∀x  =1 , ρ>0. Given a two-person team, these
assumptions place the following restriction on ρ:0<ρ<
√
.5.
• Attention will be restricted to parameter values such that p ≥ c2 so that the beneﬁt to
exerting eﬀort is at least as large as the cost.8
8Two additional parameter restrictions are discussed at the beginning of the Appendix: ψ,α ≤ 1/2 and p ≥ 1/4.
9The probability trees in Figure 2 help to illustrate the interaction between the correlation
coeﬃcients and eﬀort levels. H =1is a good outcome; L =0is a bad outcome. The
ﬁrst node in each of the trees represents the outcome for the asset class. Each asset class
experiences a good outcome with probability q and a bad outcome with probability 1−q. The
second node represents the outcome for a given money manager who has either exerted eﬀort
or has not. If eﬀort is exerted (e = 1), then a good outcome (H)i sa c hieved with probability
q.I fe ﬀort is not exerted (e = 0), then a good outcome is achieved with probability 0.
Any dependence between managers’ outcomes occurs through the correlation of their asset
classes. Unconditioned on the other manager’s performance, q = p. Conditioned on the
other manager’s asset class experiencing a good outcome, q = p + ρ(1 − p).
There are four possible outcomes for team returns: HH ≡ both managers get good
outcomes; LL ≡ both managers get bad outcomes; HL ≡ the ﬁrst manager gets a good
outcome and the second a bad; LH ≡ the ﬁrst manager gets a bad outcome and the second
ag ood.I fb oth managers exert eﬀort, then:
prob both get H = pHH = p
2 + ρp(1 − p)
prob both get L = pLL =( 1 − p)
2 + ρp(1 − p)
pHL = pLH =( 1 − ρ)p(1 − p)
If one manager exerts eﬀort, while the other doesn’t:
prob both get H = p
 
HH =0
prob both get L = p
 
LL = pLL + pHL =1− p
prob shirker gets L while worker gets H = p
 
LH = pHL + pHH = p




The problem is solved under two diﬀerent assumptions regarding the organizational form
of the team of managers. The ﬁrst organizational style considered is “noncooperative”.
With this style of organization the team members are either unable to observe each others’
actions, or if they can observe them, are unable to verify their observations in a way that
10would enable them to write contracts with each other based on such observations. The role of
the team under this assumption is two-fold: i) Managers can engage in “cheap talk” prior to
selecting their asset classes. ii) Wages paid to individuals may be based on the performance
of the team as a whole. The reason that the pre-play communication is referred to as cheap
talk is that the communication is costless and managers are unable to monitor each other.
It is also assumed that the investor is unable to monitor team members’ actions. Thus,
coordination through cheap talk is beneﬁcial to the investor only if it is incentive compatible
for each manager to agree (in the cheap-talk communication) to take actions preferred by
the investor, and for each manager to then follow the agreed upon strategy. It is assumed
that the investor can observe individual outcomes and so can pay wages to individuals that
are based either on individual or team performance, or a combination of both.
The second organizational style considered is “cooperative”. Under this type of organi-
zation, team members can monitor each others’ actions and can sign side contracts to share
wages. Managers can thus coinsure. It is again assumed that the investor cannot observe
any actions, either of the individuals or the team as a whole. Because the managers can
make side contracts, the investor will pay one wage to the team as a whole.
In Sections 4 and 5 the optimal contract is characterized for each of these types of team
organization. In Sections 5 and 6 conditions are determined such that one or the other
organizational form is optimal. In all cases the optimum is determined from the perspective
of the investor.9 In the following subsection the constraints for the noncooperative team
organization are developed. The corresponding constraints for the cooperative organization
are developed in Section 5.
2.2 Constraints under Noncooperation
Because of the symmetry of the problem (all type 2 asset classes have equal costs of exerting
eﬀort and identical distributions on outcomes), it is not necessary to model the communi-
cation stage of the game. What is necessary is to determine the optimal contract such that
it is incentive compatible both for the managers to agree in their communication to engage
9The managers’ preferences regarding organizational form are discussed in Section 6.
11in activities that the investor prefers, and for the managers to then follow the agreed upon
actions.
The contract that is oﬀered to each manager is deﬁned as a vector of values:
{wHH,w HL,w LH,w LL}, where wab is the wage paid to a money manager whose investments
return a while the other manager realizes a return of b. The optimal contract will result in
the largest possible value of equation (1), subject to satisfying the following constraints:
Individual Rationality (IR) for each manager:
E[w|x,e] − αvar[w|x,e] ≥ cx(e) (3)
Satisfying this constraint ensures that the manager will be willing to participate.
Incentive compatibility for exertion of eﬀort (eﬀort–IC):
E[w|classx,e=1 ]− αvar[w|classx,e=1 ]− cx ≥ (4)
E[w|classx,e=0 ]− αvar[w|classx,e=0 ]
where cx is shorthand for cx(1).
If the investor optimally wishes that the managers not herd (each chooses an asset class
of type 2), then the following incentive compatibility constraint (nonherding–IC) must be
satisﬁed:
E[w|class2,e] − αvar[w|class2,e] − c2 ≥ E[w|cl1,cl 2,e] − αvar[w|cl1,cl 2,e] − c1 (5)
where class2 means that both managers invest in assets of type 2 and cl1,cl 2 means that one
manager invests in an asset of type 1 and the other in an asset of type 2.10
It is assumed that money managers have limited liability so that the wage in each state
must be nonnegative:
wHH,w HL,w LH,w LL ≥ 0 . (6)
When characterizing contracts we can say that the wage contract is ﬂat if wHH = wHL =
wLH = wLL.I fthe wage contract is not ﬂat, then the wage contract is based only on individual
10In general, it is also necessary that both constraints be jointly satisﬁed. I.e., it must be incentive compatible for each
manager to choose a type 2 asset class and exert eﬀort rather than choose asset class one and not exert eﬀort. However, for the
parameter assumptions made here (zero probability of good outcome with no eﬀort) this joint constraint is redundant.
12performance if wHH = wHL and wLH = wLL and the wage contract is based only on team
performance if wHL = wLH.
Because it is assumed that a manager who exerts no eﬀort adds no value (the probability
of a good outcome with zero eﬀort is zero), the investor will always wish that managers exert
eﬀort. We must consider, however, the possibility that the cost of satisfying the nonherding
constraint may be higher than the beneﬁt, in which case the investor will optimally oﬀer a
wage contract that does not satisfy this constraint. Most of the analysis of the paper will
focus on parameter values such that the investor does optimally want the managers not to
herd. But, when determining the optimal contract as a function of risk attitudes, it will be
necessary to allow the investor to choose an undiversiﬁed portfolio. The following section
provides the necessary groundwork to do this.
3 Optimal Contracts with Herding
In this section it is assumed that ψ =0so that the investor cares only about maximizing
expected net return: E[R − W]. Thus, the investor receives no beneﬁt from portfolio
diversiﬁcation and optimally prefers the money managers to both invest in asset class one.
As such, this section covers the smaller, more standard, problem in which the agents have
only one dimension to their action space: eﬀort choice.
In a ﬁrst-best world the investor will be able to observe whether each manager has taken
the desired actions. Thus, the optimal ﬁrst-best wage contract need only satisfy the indi-
vidual rationality and limited liability constraints: (3) and (6). If the managers are also risk
neutral, so that α =0 ,then the ﬁrst-best contract can take on any form such that E[w]=c1.
If the managers are risk averse (α>0), then the ﬁrst-best contract is a ﬂat wage. If the
wage contract is not ﬂat, then the investor must pay an expected wage that is greater than
c1 in order to compensate the managers for taking on risk.
If the investor cannot observe the money managers’ actions, then the investor is faced with
a moral hazard problem and must design a wage contract that satisﬁes the eﬀort constraint.
If the managers herd and exert eﬀort, then the probabilities of the various outcomes are:
pHL = pLH =0 ,pHH = p and pLL =1 − p. Because the state HL cannot occur if
13both managers exert eﬀort, the cooperative organizational form is not relevant when the
investor does not wish to encourage diversiﬁcation. Thus, the optimal contract need only be
determined assuming noncooperation.
The eﬀort constraint, given that the managers herd, is11












It is clear that if the managers are risk neutral (α = 0), then the optimal contract will have
wHH = c1
p and wHL = wLH = wLL =0 .First-best can be achieved because we have assumed
that the probability of success, given no eﬀort, is zero.
If the managers are risk averse, then ﬁrst best cannot be achieved. In the optimal second-
best contract the investor takes advantage of the fact that the high correlation between the
managers’ returns acts somewhat as a monitoring device and the investor optimally sets
wLH =0 . (As can be seen from the above equation, the value of wHL is irrelevant.) The
diﬀerence between the wages in the states HH and LL depends on the level of the managers’
risk aversion. If α is low enough, then wLL is set to zero.
In general, the second-best contract with a risk-neutral investor will be based on a combi-
nation of individual and team performance. The risk-neutral investor’s objective function is
an increasing function only of individual performance. However, in a world with moral haz-
ard, team performance provides additional information as to whether an agent has exerted
eﬀort. For this reason, the second-best contract has a team component. In fact, consistent
with results in Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991), even if diversiﬁcation costs nothing di-
rectly (c2 = c1), a risk-neutral investor will prefer that money managers not diversify. This
is because of the monitoring value of having the managers’ outcomes highly correlated. If
the investor is risk neutral, then it is to the investor’s advantage to have managers engaging
in highly correlated tasks. In the remaining sections it is assumed that the investor is risk
averse so that the investor may wish to give up this monitoring device in the interest of
portfolio diversiﬁcation.
11See the Appendix for derivations.
144 Optimal Nonherding Contracts, with a Noncooperative
Organization
A risk-averse investor cares about portfolio diversiﬁcation. The investor will want the money
managers to avoid herding, if the cost is not too high relative to the investor’s aversion to
risk. The cost to not herding takes two forms: a higher cost of eﬀort (c2 >c 1) for which
the managers must be compensated, and the investor’s decreased ability to monitor eﬀort
by observing outcomes.
In addition to encouraging diversiﬁcation, a risk-averse investor will wish to use the wage
contract to pass some of the risk onto the money managers. This is done by paying total
wages that are an increasing, convex function of total returns. The ﬁrst-best wage contract
when the investor is risk averse and the managers are risk neutral takes a very simple form:
Nothing is paid in the state LL.I fb oth managers invest in asset classes of type 2, then
wHH = c2
pHH and wHL = wLH =0 ,a slong as 2c2 ≤ pHH.I f2 c2 >p HH, then wages are spread
across the states HH and HL, but wHH >w HL + wLH,s othat the contract is convex.12
In a ﬁrst-best world the investor need not worry about providing incentives for not herding.
Thus, as is shown in the Appendix, as long as c2 is not too much higher than c1,arisk-averse
investor strictly prefers that the managers diversify.
A contract which pays strictly higher wages for higher outcomes is consistent with encour-
aging eﬀort on the part of the money managers, but it may be inconsistent with encouraging
diversiﬁcation. The next section examines the optimal contract in the presence of moral
hazard when the investor is risk averse and the money managers are risk neutral.
4.1 Second Best when Managers are Risk Neutral
A risk-averse investor will strictly prefer that the managers not herd, as long as ψ (the
investor’s risk aversion coeﬃcient) is large enough relative to c2 − c1.I n this case, the
nonherding incentive compatibility constraint is strictly binding.13 Satisfying this constraint




HH. This is clearly not ﬁrst best. As shown above, the ﬁrst-
12The precise contract is derived in the Appendix.
13Given that the managers are risk neutral.
15best contract when the managers are risk neutral is strictly convex. Providing incentives for
money managers to diversify is thus in conﬂict with the investor’s desire to use the wage
contract to directly reduce risk by passing the risk onto the managers. Thus, we obtain the
ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. First best cannot be achieved if nonherding is ﬁrst-best optimal and the
money managers are risk neutral.
The ﬁrst-best contract when only the investor is risk averse may be based entirely on
team performance. The second-best contract speciﬁes, however, that wHL >w LH and that
wHL >w HH.T h us, the contract that is oﬀered in the presence of moral hazard is a function
both of team and individual performance. Each manager is rewarded for achieving a good
outcome and for achieving a better outcome than the other manager.
Proposition 2. If the money managers are risk neutral, then the second-best contract
that discourages herding is a “competitive” contract, in that each manager’s compensation
is decreasing in the other manager’s performance (wHH <w HL). Total wage paid in this
contract is a strictly concave function of total returns earned by the team of managers.
The contract takes the form of a competitive contract for a diﬀerent reason than in the
existing literature.14 Earlier literature has pointed out that if agents’ outcomes are highly
correlated with each other, then a competitive contract can eﬃciently encourage eﬀort,
and if agents’ outcomes are independent then a competitive contract provides no beneﬁt in
encouraging eﬀort. In this model, if the managers optimally diversify across their tasks, then
their outcomes are independent. The strictly competitive aspect of the contract is used to
encourage managers to diversify, so that their outcomes will be independent.
4.2 First Best when Managers are Risk Averse
The ﬁrst-best contract is the contract that optimally allocates risk between the investor
and managers. The investor lowers her own risk by designing a contract with a positive
covariance between total wages and total investment returns. The problem is that such a
contract increases the risk for the managers, and the investor must compensate the managers
14See the Introduction for a discussion of the literature.
16for taking on risk by oﬀering them a higher expected wage. The optimal ﬁrst-best contract
balances these two concerns. Such a contract is based entirely on team performance (wHL =
wLH), because adding an individual component to the contract (wHL  = wLH), increases
the variance of individual wages, without aﬀecting the covariance of total wages with total
returns. Thus, when money managers are risk averse, it is strictly suboptimal in a ﬁrst-best
world to base wages even partially on individual performance.15
The ﬁrst-best risk-sharing contract will be linear in total returns, unless the limited li-
ability constraints, which prevent the investor from paying a negative wage in the event of
the worst outcome, are strictly binding. If the limited liability constraints are nonbinding,
then the optimal risk-sharing contract takes the form:16











where x is such that Individual Rationality is exactly satisﬁed. If limited liability is binding
then the optimal contract takes the form:
wHL = wLH = x










where x  is such that Individual Rationality is exactly satisﬁed. It is shown in the Appendix
that in this case x  <
ψ
α+2ψ,s othat wHH > 2wHL. The ﬁrst-best contract is thus either
linear or convex in total returns.
4.3 Second Best when Managers are Risk Averse
A risk-averse investor wishes to align wages with returns, so that the total wage paid is
strictly increasing in total return. This objective is consistent with providing managers with
incentives to exert eﬀort. However, as shown in section 4.1, if the managers are risk neutral,
then it is inconsistent with providing incentives for managers to diversify. When managers
are risk neutral, satisfaction of the nonherding–IC constraint requires that the investor pay
strictly more in states where the managers have diﬀerent outcomes: wHL+wLH >w HH+wLL.
This is in conﬂict with the investor’s objective of minimizing her own risk.
15The ﬁrst-best contract is derived in the Appendix and this statement is proved.












. The contract presented here for limited liability
nonbinding takes the same form as the risk-sharing contract presented in Barry and Starks (1984).
17In this section the optimal contract is characterized only for the case such that the investor
optimally prefers that the managers not herd.17 When managers are risk averse, the investor’s
and the managers’ incentives become better aligned in this regard. This is because, under the
ﬁrst-best contract, a manager who deviates and herds causes (for most parameter values) the
variance of her wages to increase as a result of herding. This is because under the ﬁrst-best
contract wages are based only on team outcome: wHH >w HL = wLH ≥ wLL.I famanager
deviates and herds, then some probability weight shifts from the set of outcomes within which
the manager receives a constant wage ({HL,LH})t othe set of outcomes within which wage
is not constant ({HH,LL}), thus increasing the variance of individual wage.18 This increase
in variance, together with the managers’ aversion to risk, enables the ﬁrst-best contract to
satisfy the nonherding incentive compatibility constraint for some parameter values. The
following proposition states this result, but also points out that this is not suﬃcient for ﬁrst
best to be attained.
Proposition 3. If both the investor and the money managers are risk averse, and the
managers do not cooperate, then:
• there exist parameter values such that the ﬁrst-best wage contract provides suﬃcient incen-
tives for the managers not to herd.
• However, ﬁrst best still cannot be achieved.
It is only when the managers are risk averse that it is possible for the ﬁrst-best contract
to provide suﬃcient incentives not to herd. A ﬁrst-best contract that is not highly convex
will satisfy the nonherding incentive compatibility constraint, if the managers are risk averse
and the incremental cost of exerting eﬀort when not herding is not too high. However, any
contract, such as the ﬁrst-best contract, that is based only on team performance and that
just satisﬁes the participation (incentive rationality) constraint will not satisfy the eﬀort
17In Section 6 numerical examples are presented that include cases where the investor optimally prefers not to pay the extra
cost of diversiﬁcation.
18It is shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that a deviation from the investor’s ﬁrst-best asset choice causes the managers’
variance of wage to increase for all but very extreme parameter values. It is only in the case that the wage contract is highly
convex (very little wage is paid in any state other than HH) and the probability of state HH is quite high, that such a deviation
will lower the managers’ wage variance. A suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for the managers’ variance of wage to increase
is p ≤ 0.6642. Even if this condition does not hold, the variance will increase, unless in addition c2 is very small and/or the
investor is much more risk averse than the managers.
18incentive compatibility constraint. For this reason, even if incentives are aligned with regard
to asset choice, ﬁrst best cannot be achieved.
Finally, we can investigate the form of the second-best contract when both the investor
and money managers are risk averse. We know that the ﬁrst-best contract is based entirely
on team performance. In the presence of moral hazard the optimal contract may have an
individual component, but it will never be based entirely on individual performance. The
reason is that a contract based only on individual performance cannot provide incentives for
not herding.
Proposition 4. If both the investor and money managers are risk averse, and the team is
noncooperative, then the second-best contract that encourages diversiﬁcation:
a) cannot be based entirely on individual performance.
b) is based entirely on team performance if and only if the eﬀort constraint is nonbinding.
However, in this case total wage paid is still a strictly concave function of total returns.
The second-best contract will generally be based on both individual and team perfor-
mance. It is necessary to have a team component to the contract in order to discourage
herding. If money managers are risk neutral, then in order to discourage herding the sec-
ond best contract must include a “competitive” element. If the managers are risk averse,
the second-best contract may be based only on team performance, without a competitive
element: wHH ≥ wHL = wLH ≥ wLL. But, even if the contract is noncompetitive, it will be
similar to the competitive contract in that total wages paid to the team are strictly concave
in total returns. (Keep in mind that the ﬁrst-best risk-sharing contract is convex.) In a
concave contract, wLH − wLL >w HH − wHL.T h us, a contract that is both noncompetitive
(wHH − wHL ≥ 0) and concave induces the managers to take the desired actions mainly by
punishing the team in states such that both managers do poorly (low value for wLL), rather
than rewarding individuals.
195C ooperation between Managers
Up to this point it has been assumed either that the managers cannot observe each others’
actions, or if they can, such observations are unveriﬁable so that the managers are unable to
write contracts among themselves based on such observations. Under this assumption the
only means that the managers have for coordinating their actions is through “cheap talk”
communication. In this section an alternative team organization is investigated in which the
managers may “cooperate” among themselves. The notion of cooperation employed here is
a somewhat limited version of that employed by Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991). In that
paper agents can not only monitor each other’s eﬀorts and share payments, but they can
also share in the completion of tasks. Each manager here must still complete her own task
separately, but the managers can monitor each other and can sign side contracts to share
wages. I.e., managers can coinsure. As in the rest of the paper, it is still assumed here that
the investor is unable to observe any actions taken by the managers. The purpose of this
section is to determine whether, and under what conditions, the investor is better oﬀ with
this alternative organizational form.
Because the managers can sign side contracts, the investor pays a single wage to the
team and the money managers agree among themselves as to how they will share the wage.
The managers can also make agreements regarding who will take which actions. For this
reason, the moral hazard problem becomes a bit more complicated in that the contract
must now satisfy two nonherding incentive compatibility constraints and two eﬀort incentive
compatibility constraints. This is because it must be incentive compatible for both managers
to take each desired action versus only one doing so and versus neither doing so.19 The precise
constraints are presented in the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
Allowing for cooperation does not change the ﬁrst-best contract. This contract is based
only on total team performance. It is only in the second-best world, where the investor cannot
observe actions, that the organizational style of the team, cooperation versus noncooperation,
matters. Thus, the nature of the second-best contract, and the value of the investor’s
19The eﬀort incentive compatibility constraints also diﬀer in that if the managers agree that only one manager will exert
eﬀort, then that manager will exert eﬀort in class one, rather than class two.
20objective function in a second-best world, may change.
The case investigated by Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) is that of a risk-neutral princi-
pal and risk-averse agents. They showed that if agents’ outcomes are highly correlated, then
allowing for cooperation between the agents worsens the principal’s outcome. This occurs
for two reasons. First, if the agents’ outcomes are highly correlated then the principal can
best encourage eﬀort with a competitive contract. Second, because of the high correlation,
there is no (or little) coinsurance beneﬁt for the agents. The Ramakrishnan and Thakor
result carries over to this model. If the investor’s risk attitude, relative to the incremental
cost of diversiﬁcation, is such that she prefers that the managers do not diversify (so that
their outcomes are highly correlated), then she will optimally encourage the managers to
exert eﬀort by oﬀering them each a competitive contract.
If the investor is risk averse and the managers risk neutral, then cooperation makes
it less expensive for the investor to induce the managers not to herd. (The reason for
this is discussed below following Proposition 6.) However, it is found that satisfying the
nonherding-incentive-compatibility constraints still requires, when the managers are risk
neutral, that total wages are a concave function of total returns. Thus, with risk-neutral
managers cooperation does not enable ﬁrst best to be achieved. However, if the managers
are risk averse, then there is an added beneﬁt to cooperation in that it permits the managers
to coinsure. This added beneﬁt, together with the lower cost of discouraging herding, can
enable ﬁrst best to be achieved.
Proposition 5. If the money managers are able to cooperate in their decisions and in
their sharing of wages, and if they are risk averse, then there exist parameter values such
that the investor can achieve ﬁrst best. Cooperation does not enable the investor to achieve
ﬁrst best if the managers are risk neutral.
This proposition is proved in the Appendix by ﬁrst showing that ﬁrst best cannot be
achieved if the money managers are risk neutral. Next, an example is found in which ﬁrst
best can be achieved. In this example, both the investor and the managers are risk averse,
and the parameter values are such that the ﬁrst-best contract is linear, but limited liability is
just binding: wLL =0 ,w HL+wLH = wHH.I naddition, the incremental cost of diversiﬁcation
21is low enough relative to the beneﬁt of diversiﬁcation, so that the nonherding constraints
are satisﬁed by the ﬁrst-best contract, with and without cooperation. In this example, if the
managers are unable to cooperate, then the eﬀort constraint is not satisﬁed by the ﬁrst-best
contract. With cooperation, however, the eﬀort constraints are satisﬁed and ﬁrst best is
achieved.
It is clear from Proposition 5 that cooperation will improve the investor’s second-best
outcome for at least some parameter values. To further understand the potential beneﬁts
and costs of switching to a cooperative organization we next examine how such a switch
would aﬀect the cost of satisfying each set of incentive compatibility constraints: nonherding
and eﬀort. Proposition 6 summarizes these results. An intuitive explanation of the reasoning
follows the proposition.
Proposition 6.
a) Allowing for cooperation among money managers will, for most parameter values, decrease
the cost of discouraging herding.
b) If the managers are risk neutral (risk averse), then enabling cooperation cannot (can)
decrease the cost of encouraging eﬀort.
For most parameter values allowing for cooperation decreases the cost of discouraging
herding. This occurs because, under cooperation, the managers recognize that herding be-
havior by one manager aﬀects both of them. From a manager’s perspective, the potential
beneﬁt of herding is the same as with noncooperation (lower cost of exerting eﬀort), but
the cost is higher, because under cooperation a herder recognizes the total team’s wage
loss (and/or increase in variance). It is shown in the Appendix that a suﬃcient (but not
necessary) condition for cooperation to decrease the cost of discouraging herding is that
the noncooperative contract be either linear or concave in total returns. It is only if the
noncooperative contract is convex and the relative incremental cost of diversifying is very
small,20 that allowing for cooperation may increase the cost of discouraging herding. Thus,
if discouraging herding under noncooperation is costly, then switching to a cooperative team
organization will reduce this cost.
20(c2 − c1)/(ρp(1 − p)) very small
22In the problem posed here, however, the contract must satisfy not only a nonherding
constraint, but also an eﬀort constraint. These two constraints interact in a such a way that,
even though discouraging herding may be cheaper with cooperation, a noncooperative orga-
nizational form may still dominate cooperation. This is easiest to understand by considering
the case of risk-neutral money managers. Under both cooperation and noncooperation, if
the managers are risk neutral, then the nonherding–IC constraint requires that total wages
beaconcave function of total returns: wHL + wLH >w HH + wLL. (Even though the cost
of discouraging herding generally decreases with cooperation, the cost still remains strictly
positive.) This functional form causes the eﬀort constraint to become more diﬃcult to sat-
isfy under cooperation. The reason is that, under cooperation the managers can increase
the probability of achieving diﬀerent outcomes (HL)b yc o ordinating so that one works and
the other doesn’t.21 As such, cooperation never decreases, and generally increases, the cost
of inducing eﬀort when the managers are risk neutral. While this is most easily seen in the
extreme case of risk neutral managers, the result will also hold for risk averse managers, if
the risk aversion is relatively low. In contrast, if the managers are risk averse enough, then
the coinsurance beneﬁt of cooperation, together with the lower cost of inducing nonherding,
will cause cooperation to be the optimal form of organization.
These results highlight the importance of having modelled this problem with two dimen-
sions to the incentive compatibility problem: nonherding and exertion of eﬀort. If I had
instead modelled the problem only with a nonherding incentive compatibility constraint,
then I would have incorrectly concluded that cooperation is for most parameter values the
optimal form of organization. Instead, the requirements of encouraging both nonherding
and exertion of eﬀort interact in such a way that the optimal organizational form depends
on the parameter values. Because of this interaction I have up to this point been able only
to state conditions such that allowing for cooperation is not beneﬁcial and conditions such
that it may be beneﬁcial to the investor. It is expected, however, that cooperation will be
more beneﬁcial if the managers, and possibly also the investor, are more risk averse. This
intuition is conﬁrmed by the results of the following section.
21There is also the eﬀect that when cooperating, if exactly one manager works, then that manager invests in class 1, so that
the team saves an amount 2c2 − c1 in eﬀort costs, rather than saving just c2.
236C ooperation versus Competition
In the proofs of Propositions 4 through 6, algorithms are derived for determining the optimal
contracts under noncooperation and cooperation when everyone is risk averse. These algo-
rithms are complex enough so that in the previous sections it was only possible to characterize
the optimal contracts, rather than present general analytical solutions. (If the managers are
risk neutral, then simple analytical solutions are obtained.) It is possible, however, to use
these algorithms to determine numerically the optimal contract, for any given set of param-
eters. In this section, the choices of organizational form and optimal contract are further
explored through the use of numerical calculations.
Based on the results of the previous section it is expected that an increase in the risk
aversion of the money managers will make cooperation more advantageous relative to com-
petition. This result is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows how the optimal organizational
form and contract style vary with risk attitudes. The optimal form is that form that results
in the highest expected utility for the investor. The investor’s risk aversion coeﬃcient (ψ)
is plotted along the horizontal axis and the managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient (α)i splotted
along the vertical axis.22
When the investor is not very risk averse she optimally chooses not to pay the extra cost
of diversiﬁcation and so oﬀers a wage contract that motivates eﬀort, but does not discourage
herding. This is indicated in Figure 3 by the “Nondiversiﬁed” region. As discussed in Section
3, without diversiﬁcation the choice of organizational form is not relevant. As the investor
becomes more risk averse, providing incentives to diversify becomes optimal. In both the
“Competitive” and “Cooperative” regions of Figure 3 the contract oﬀered to the managers
provides incentives both to exert eﬀort and not to herd. As the managers become more
risk averse cooperation dominates noncooperation. For all parameter values tested, it was
found that if noncooperation dominates cooperation, then the optimal contract is strictly
22In Figures 3 and 4, p =0 .7, ρ =0 .7, c1 =0 .300 and c2 =0 .30875. At each point sampled in Figure 3, ﬁrst the optimal
contract was determined for each of the three styles: nondiversiﬁcation, diversiﬁcation without cooperation, diversiﬁcation with
cooperation. Next, the style with the highest expected utility for the investor was selected as the optimal style. The same
method was used to create the graphs of Figure 4, except that in the left-hand (right-hand) graph only nondiversiﬁcation and
diversiﬁcation without cooperation (with cooperation) were considered. The “jaggedness” of the boundaries occurs for two
reasons: i) The sampling is done at the intersection points of a 50×50 grid. ii) In the neighborhoods of the boundaries the value
functions for the diﬀerent styles are close to equal. Any apparent nonmonotonicities along the boundaries are due to limitations
in the precision of the optimization algorithm, rather than any economic phenomenon.













Figure 3: Optimal Contract Style
ψ =i nvestor’s risk aversion coeﬃcient
α = money managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient
competitive.
If the money managers are highly risk averse, then even when the investor is relatively
risk tolerant, it is optimal to organize the team to allow for cooperation and to oﬀer a single
team contract that discourages herding. This is because the risk aversion of the managers
makes it relatively low cost for the investor to motivate nonherding. This is illustrated in
the graphs of Figure 4 which show the tradeoﬀ between diversifying or not, where just one
organizational form is considered for motivating nonherding. As Figure 4a illustrates, if
only a noncooperative organization is considered, then the decision of whether to discourage
herding is driven almost entirely by the investor’s risk attitude. Figure 4b shows that if
cooperation is considered, then the risk attitude of the managers also matters.
Figure 4 is also important in that up to this point the discussion of the “optimal” orga-
nizational form has been entirely from the perspective of the investor. Figure 3 was drawn
assuming that the investor is able to determine the organizational form. This is not a con-
cern in the cooperative form. In this organizational form, the team is paid just one wage and
so the team members do not have incentives to subvert the investor’s chosen organizational
form. In the noncooperative form, however, it may be possible for the team members to






















4a: Noncooperative only 4b: Cooperative only
Figure 4: Optimal Contract Style
ψ =i nvestor’s risk aversion coeﬃcient
α = money managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient
subvert the investor’s wishes and sign side contracts to cooperate with each other. Given
that the optimal contract under noncooperation is strictly competitive, i.e. wHL >w HH,
the managers will have incentives to coordinate so that only one of them works, and they
split both the salary and the cost of working. If a noncooperative environment cannot be
maintained and managers are able to sign side contracts, then Figure 4b, rather than Figure
3, will illustrate the tradeoﬀ between optimal contract styles.23 However, this is likely not
to be a signiﬁcant concern, because a manager who does well will want ex post to subvert
such a side contract. Given that such side contracts are not sanctioned by the investor such
subversion will likely work, making side contracting infeasible.
It is also found that the organizational form aﬀects the relationship between the investor’s
expected utility and the managers’ risk attitudes. Under noncooperation, the investor’s
expected utility is strictly decreasing in the risk aversion of the managers. This is because
the investor must compensate the managers for taking on risk. Under cooperation, however,
the investor’s expected utility may be increasing or decreasing in the managers’ risk aversion.
23Forasimilar result in a somewhat diﬀerent setting, the reader is referred to Slezak and Khanna (2000).


























































Figure 5: Cooperative Contract
Expected utility (EU) and contract convexity versus managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient (α), for three diﬀerent
levels of incremental diversiﬁcation cost (c2−c1). Convexity is less (greater) than one for a contract in which
the total wages are a concave (convex) function of the total return.
The diﬀerence occurs for two reasons. First, under cooperation the managers can coinsure so
that the investor need not compensate them as much for taking on risk. Second, as discussed
in the previous section, under cooperation each manager recognizes the full cost imposed on
the team by herding. Part of this cost is due to an increased variance of wages. Thus,
risk aversion on the part of the managers is more eﬀective, under cooperation than under
noncooperation, in helping to align incentives.
Figure 5 presents the results of a number of calculations of the optimal contract under
cooperation. The left-hand graphs show the investor’s expected utility, and the right-hand
graphs show the convexity of the wage contract, versus the managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient,
α. The variable “convexity” is (2wHH − wHL − wLH)/(wHL + wLH − 2wLL). Thus, values
of “convexity” less than one indicate that the contract is concave; values greater than one
27indicate it is convex. The top two graphs are for the same example as is illustrated in Figures
3 and 4, with ψ =0 .25. In this example the cooperative contract is concave for all but very
high values of the managers’ risk aversion, and the investor’s expected utility is increasing
in the managers’ risk aversion. In the middle and lower graphs, the parameter values are
the same except that the incremental cost of exerting eﬀort when not herding (c2 − c1)i s
smaller.24
As is indicated by Figure 5, the shape of the optimal contract depends on the incremental
cost of diversiﬁcation. As this cost decreases, the optimal contract becomes more convex.
If this cost is high enough so that optimal contract is concave or only slightly convex, then
it is also the case that the investor’s expected utility is increasing in the managers’ risk
aversion. This is due to the fact that the risk aversion of the money managers helps to align
the incentives of the investor and managers with regard to herding. For low enough values of
the incremental cost of diversiﬁcation, the incentive-alignment beneﬁt of higher risk aversion
on the part of the managers is overwhelmed by the extra amount that must be paid to the
managers for taking on risk. Thus, when the incremental cost of diversiﬁcation is low, the
investor’s expected utility is decreasing in the managers’ risk aversion.
Figure 5 illustrates further that as the managers become more risk averse, the optimal
cooperative contract becomes more convex (less concave). As discussed earlier, a concave
contract may be necessary in order to motivate the managers not to herd. This is costly to
the investor who would prefer a convex contract in order to transfer risk to the managers.
As the managers become more risk averse, it is possible to discourage herding with a less
concave contract.
In summary, as the managers’ risk aversion increases and/or the incremental cost of di-
versiﬁcation decreases, cooperation becomes optimal and the contract becomes more convex
(less concave). If the cost of diversiﬁcation is signiﬁcant, then increased risk aversion on the
part of the managers can increase the investor’s expected utility, despite the extra amount
that the investor must pay to compensate the managers for taking on risk.
24In Figure 5, ψ =0 .25, p =0 .7, ρ =0 .7, c1 =0 .300. In the top graph c2 =0 .30875; in the middle c2 =0 .304; in the bottom
c2 =0 .3005. Although not shown here, if the equivalent graphs to Figure 3 were shown for the latter two examples, cooperation
would be optimal for most values of risk aversion.
287 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the optimal wage contract and optimal orgainizational form for a
team of money managers, given a risk-averse investor. The problem examined here is unique
in that the investor wishes to provide incentives for the managers to both exert eﬀort and to
choose tasks that are not highly correlated with each other so as to minimize the investor’s
risk. In all cases examined, the optimal contract is performance based. But, the performance
that is relevant may be that of individual managers, of the team as a whole or of the two
combined.
It is shown that the optimal structure of the contract and the optimal organizational
form of the team depend on the risk attitudes of the managers and the investor. If the
managers are relatively risk tolerant, then a noncooperative team organizaton and a strictly
competitive contract, in which each manager is rewarded both for doing well and for doing
better than the team, is the most eﬃcient way to discourage herding within the team. This
is despite the fact that, in such a contract total wages paid are a concave function of total
returns, and so using the contract to discourage herding (and thus lower risk) is in direct
conﬂict with the investor’s objective of using the contract to transfer risk onto the managers.
As the managers become more risk averse, it becomes less necessary to oﬀer a competitive
contract in order to discourage herding. As the risk aversion of both the investor and the
managers increases, cooperation among managers becomes the optimal way to organize the
team. Under cooperation managers are paid as a team, rather than as individuals, thus
enabling them to coinsure among themselves. For some parameter values, if everyone is risk
averse, ﬁrst best can be achieved under cooperation. First best can never be achieved if only
the investor or only the managers are risk averse, or if cooperation is not possible.
298 Appendix
Notation:
ψ =i nvestor’s risk aversion coeﬃcient
α = money managers’ risk aversion coeﬃcient
p = probability that single manager’s return is 1, given that eﬀort is exerted
ρ = cross correlation between assets in class one and assets in any other classes
ck = cost of exerting eﬀort in class k, c2 >c 1
pab = probability that manager i’s investment returns a and j’s returns b, given that both
exert eﬀort
p 
ab = probability that manager i’s investment returns a and j’s returns b, given that i
shirks and j exerts eﬀort
wab =w age paid to manager whose investment returns a when other manager’s returns b
W = sum of wages paid to two managers
r = realized return for individual manager
R = sum of returns across two managers
Parameter restrictions:
1. c1 <c 2 <p
2. ψ ≤ 1
2 α ≤ 1
2 (The ﬁrst of these ensures that the investor never ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
give money away in order to decrease risk.)
3. p ≥ .25 (This assumption is made purely to ease the proof of Proposition 3. It is a
suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for the result.)
Derivation of eﬀort–IC, risk-averse managers herd. pHL =0 ,pHH = p, pLL =1− p.
var[w|e =1 ] = p(1 − p)(wHH − wLL)
2











HH +2 wLL(wHH − wLH)
 
E[w|e =1 ]− E[w|e =0 ] = p(wHH − wLH)
The eﬀort–IC constraint (7) follows directly from applying these to equation (4).
First best, risk-neutral managers. The investor’s objective function is:
max
  w
Z =2 E[r − w] − ψvar[R − W]
=2 E[r] − 2E[w] − ψvar[R] − ψvar[W]+2 ψ (E[RW] − 4ErEw)
In the ﬁrst-best contract, IR is exactly satisﬁed: Ew = c. (It is assumed that ψ is not so
high that the investor will wish to give away cash to decrease variance.)
var[R]=var[r1 + r2]=2(1 + ρ)p(1 − p)
var[W]=2(2pHHw
2





30With no herding (ρ = 0):
var[R]=2 var[r]=2 p(1 − p)
E[RW]=4 p




HH + p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)






Z =2 ( p − c2) − 2ψp(1 − p) − 8ψpc2 + ψ(2E[RW] − var[W])
Only the last term depends on the form of the wage contract. Dividing this term by the








subject to: p2wHH + p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)+( 1− p)2wLL = c2. Clearly w∗
LL =0 .Letting
wb ≡ (wHL + wLH), wb =
c2−p2wHH
p(1−p) . Substituting this into V above and taking the partial
derivative wrt wHH it is found that
















Because we have assumed that p>c 2, wHH is always >w HL + wLH. Note also that setting
wHL = wLH,s othat the contract is based only on team performance, is ﬁrst-best optimal.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. If c2 −c1 is so high that the investor prefers, in a ﬁrst-
best world, that the managers herd, then ﬁrst best can be attained (because the probability
of a good outcome with zero eﬀort is zero). The focus here is on parameter values such that
nonherding is ﬁrst-best optimal.
eﬀort–IC:






2wHH + p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)+( 1− p)
2wLL − c2 ≥
(p
2 + δρ)wHH +( p(1 − p) − δρ)(wHL + wLH)+((1 − p)
2 + δρ)wLL − c1







where δρ = ρp(1 − p). Limited liability: wHH,w HL,w LH,w LL ≥ 0
Incentive rationality, given eﬀort–IC and limited liability, is nonbinding.
Based on these constraints and the ﬁrst best derivation above, it is clear that when money
managers are risk neutral, w∗
LL = w∗
LH =0 . ( wLH either appears in negative form on the
LHS of a constraint, or appears in additive form with wHL.) The constraints are thus:
pwHH +( 1− p)wHL ≥
c2
p




The ﬁrst constraint can be satisﬁed with a ﬁrst-best contract, but the second prevents the
investor from achieving ﬁrst best. The second constraint requires that wHL >w HH.
31First best, risk-averse money managers. This contract is derived for later comparison
with the 2nd-best contract. With no herding ρ =0 :
max
  w
Z =2 ( p − c2) − 2ψp(1 − p) − 2αvar[w] − ψvar[W]+2 ψ (E[RW] − 4ErEw)
E[RW]=4 p
2wHH +2 p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)
Ew = p
2wHH + p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)+( 1− p)
2wLL
E[RW] − 4ErEw = 4(1 − p)p
2wHH + 2(1 − 2p)p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH) − 4p(1 − p)
2wLL
var[W]=2 var[w]+2 cov(w1,w 2)=4 var[w] − 2p(1 − p)(wHL − wLH)
2
cov(w1,w 2|ρ =0 ) = p(1 − p)
 
2(wHLwLH − wHHwLL)
−2(pwHH +( 1− p)wLL)(wHL + wLH − wHH − wLL)
−p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH − wHH − wLL)
2
 
The investor wishes to:
min
  w
V =( α +2 ψ)var[w] − ψp(1 − p)(wHL − wLH)
2 (15)
−2ψp(1 − p)(2pwHH +( 1− 2p)(wHL + wLH) − 2(1 − p)wLL)
subject to: (IR is just satisﬁed in ﬁrst best.)
Ew = c2 + αvar[w] (16)
















2wLL(wHL + wLH) − 2p(1 − p)wHHwLL
 
Can the investor beneﬁt by setting wHL  = wLH? Suppose that wHH = wHL−ε = wLH +ε =
wLL. V in equation (15) becomes V (ε)=2 αp(1−p)ε2 > 0, so that the value of the objective
function is worse than with a constant wage. Thus, in the ﬁrst-best contract wages are based
entirely on team performance.
The ﬁrst-best contract will be: wHL = wLH = x, wHH = x+εH and wLL = x−εL, where x
is determined so as to satisfy equation (16) and εH and εL are chosen to minimize V .( W e
will also need to check that the limited liability is satisﬁed: x ≥ 0, εL ≤ x and εH ≥− x.)
V (εH,ε L)=p(1 − p)
 
(α +2 ψ)((pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2
H +( 1− p)ε
2
L)











=2 p(1 − p)
2
 










32Because ε∗ > 0, limited liability requires us only to check that ε∗
L ≤ x. Solving for x:
E[  w|εH,ε L]=c2 + αvar[  w|εH,ε L]
x + p
2ε − (1 − p)
2ε = c2 +2 αp(1 − p)ε
2


































(α +2 ψ)((1 + p)εH +( 1− p)x










− (1 − p)x
 
 
Solving for x :
E[  w|εH,ε L]=c2 + αvar[  w|εH,ε L]
(2 − p)px
  + p




H +( 1− p)(2 − p)x









2r − (1 − p)x 
1+p
 














2 − 4(1 − p)rx
  +( 1− p)
2x






















2 − (1 − p)
2x









c2 = α(1 − p)
 
2pr









− pr(1 − 2α(1 − p)r)
We are considering the case such that condition (17) doesn’t hold. Thus:
x
  − α(1 − p)
2x
 2 < (1 + p)r(1 − α(1 − p)r) − pr(1 − 2α(1 − p)r)




  − r<α (1 − p)
2(x
  + r)(x
  − r)
x
  >r⇐⇒ 1 <α (1 − p)
2(x
  + r)
x
  <r⇐⇒ 1 >α (1 − p)
2(x
  + r)
33We know that x  < 1 (the investor does not pay more than he receives), r<1
2 and α<1
2.
Thus, the last inequality holds (x  <r ), so that ε∗
H >x   = ε∗
L and the contract is convex.
(Note: x  must ≥ 0, so if c2 is very small, then x  =0and a positive wage is paid only in the
state wHH. Again, the contract is convex in total returns.)
Proof of Proposition 3.
var[w|e =1 ] = pHH(1 − pHH)w
2










−2pHHpHLwHH(wHL + wLH) − 2pLLpHLwLL(wHL + wLH) − 2pHHpLLwHHwLL
If a manager deviates and herds, then probability weight shifts from outcomes HL and LH
to HH and LL.I fb oth invest in type 2 assets and exert eﬀort:
pHH = p
2 pLL =( 1− p)
2 pHL = pLH = p(1 − p)




2 + δρ p
  
LL =( 1− p)




LH = p(1 − p) − δρ








2 + δρ)(1 − p







2 + δρ)(1 − (1 − p)




HL =( pHL − δρ)
2 = p
2





HL =( pHH + δρ)(pHL − δρ)=pHHpHL − δρ(pHH − pHL + δρ)=pHHpHL − δρ(2p











LL =( pHH + δρ)(pLL + δρ)=pHHpLL + δρ(pHH + pLL + δρ)=pHHpLL + δρ(1 − 2p +2 p
2 + δρ)
If a manager invests in asset class 1, while the other invests in an asset class of type 2 (while






HH − (1 − 4p +2 p
2 + δρ)w
2
LL − 2(1 − 2p +2 p
2 + δρ)wHHwLL
+(2p − 2p







2 − p + δρ)wHH(wHL + wLH)+2(1 − 3p +2 p
2 + δρ)wLL(wHL + wLH)
 
Under the ﬁrst-best contract w/o limited liability binding:
φ
δρ
=( 1 − 2p
2 − δρ)(2εx + ε
2) − (1 − 4p +2 p
2 + δρ)(−2εx + ε













=( 1 − 2p
2 − δρ)(2εHx
  + ε
2




2 − p + δρ)εHx
  − 4(1 − 3p +2 p
2 + δρ)x
 2 + 2(1 − 2p +2 p
2 + δρ)x
 2
= 2(1 − 2p +2 p
2)εHx
  +( 1− 2p
2)ε
2
H − (1 − 4p +2 p
2)x





H − 4p(εH − x
 )x
  − (1+2 p










2 − 4p(1 + p)(r − x
 )x
  − (1+2 p










 2 + 4(1 − p)(1 + p)(r − x
 )x
  + 2(1 − 2p




x  <r ,s othe middle term is positive. A suﬃcient, but not necessary, condition for φ to be
positive is p ≤ 0.6642. Even if this condition does not hold, φ will still be positive unless
x  is also very small (very small c2) and/or r is large (the investor is much more risk averse
than the managers).
The next step is to check if the IC constraints can be satisﬁed with the ﬁrst-best contract.
Let Y ≡ Ew− αvar[w]. nonherding–IC requires that ∆2 ≥ c2−c1
ρp(1−p) where
∆2 ≡
Y |class2 − Y |class1
ρp(1 − p)
= εL − εH +
αφ
δρ
nonherding–IC is clearly satisﬁed with a linear ﬁrst-best contract if 2αε2 ≥ c2 − c1.
eﬀort–IC requires that ∆1 ≥ c2
p . var[w|e =0 ]=p(1−p)(wLH −wLL)2 = p(1−p)ε2
L. Using
the derivations from the ﬁrst best calculations:
∆1 ≡
Y |effort− Y |noeffort
p




H +( 1− 3p + p
2)ε
2
L +2 p(1 − p)εHεL
 
Individual rationality requires that ∆3 =( Ew−αvar[w])/p ≥ c2
p .I nthe ﬁrst-best contract
this is satisﬁed with equality, so a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the ﬁrst best contract












H +( 2− 3p + p
2)ε
2
L +2 p(1 − p)εHεL
 
Because of limited liability, x ≥ εL and ∆3 − ∆1 ≥ εL − α(1 − p)ε2
L. Suﬃcient for this to
be strictly positive is εL < 2, which is certainly satisﬁed. Thus, the ﬁrst-best contract does
not satisfy the eﬀort constraint.
Proof of Proposition 4. Second best, managers are risk averse. The derivation
of the ﬁrst-best contract and the derivations from the proof of Proposition 3 are applied,
with the diﬀerence that it may be optimal here to have wHL >w LH. Let wHH = x + εH,
wHL = x+εM, wLH = x−εM and wLL = x−εL. This proof answers the following questions:
Can the optimal contract: a) be based only on individual performance: εH = εM = εL?
b) be based only on team performance: εM =0 ? The investor wishes to:
max
  w
Z =2 E[r − w] − ψvar[R − W]
=2 p − 2Ew− ψvar[R] − ψvar[W]+2 ψ (E[RW] − 4pEw)
35If managers don’t herd (ρ =0 )and exert eﬀort, then
Ew = x + p
2εH − (1 − p)
2εL
var[R]=2 p(1 − p)
E[RW]=4 p
2wHH +2 p(1 − p)(wHL + wLH)=4 px +4 p
2εH
var[W]=4 var[w] − 2p(1 − p)(wHL − wLH)





(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2






Z =2 p − 2ψp(1 − p) − 2x − 2p




(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2





2(1 − p)εH +8 ψp(1 − p)
2εL
∆1 = pεH +( 1− p)εL + ε (19)
−α(1 − p)
 




















M + 2(1 − 2p +2 p
2 + δρ)εHεL
 










(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2






The problem can now be written as
min
x,εH,εL,εM
V = x +2 ψp(1 − p)
 
(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2

















,ε L,ε M ≤ x, x + εH,x+ εM ≥ 0
(x will be as small as possible, subject to satisfying the individual rationality and limited
liability constraints.)
a) If εH = εM = εL = ε, then ∆2 =0and the nonherding–IC constraint is not satisﬁed.
Thus, the second best contract cannot be based only on individual performance.
b) Try εM =0 :(Contract is based only on team performance.)
Lagrangian: We know from the proof of Proposition 3 that individual rationality is non-
binding (λ3 =0 )i fεM =0 . (Also, the limited liability constraints that contain εM are
36nonbinding.)
L[x,εH,ε L,ε M,λ 1,λ 2]=−V − λ1(
c2
p






















If λ1 > 0 (eﬀort constraint is binding), then εL = 1
2α(1−p) ≥ 1
1−p =⇒ wHL + wLH ≥ 2
1−p =⇒
EW ≥ 2ER. This is clearly suboptimal; the investor would prefer to pay no salary and
have no eﬀort exerted. If the eﬀort constraint is strictly binding (and the investor optimally
prefers the managers to choose assets of type 2 and exert eﬀort), then it must be the case
that ε∗
M > 0.
Suppose λ1 =0(eﬀort constraint is nonbinding). Because ﬁrst-best cannot be achieved,
nonherding–IC must be binding (λ2 > 0). It is clear from looking at the optimization
problem that if the nonherding–IC constraint is the only binding constraint (apart from the
limited liability constraints), then it is optimal for εM to be set to zero. Also, if constraints
1 and 3 are nonbinding, then ε∗
L >ε ∗
H,s othat the contract is strictly concave. The contract
induces nonherding and eﬀort exertion by the threat of punishment to the team.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Risk-neutral managers: With cooperation, the wage contract must satisfy two eﬀort con-
straints and two nonherding constraints: The managers must prefer both of them working
to only one working and both working to neither working. They must prefer both choosing
type 2 asset classes to one investing in class one and to both investing in class one. Only the
total wage in state HL, wHL + wLH, matters. Let wb ≡ wHL + wLH. The nonherding–IC
(assuming eﬀort is exerted) constraint (13) becomes:














The nonherding constraint is easier to satisfy with cooperation, but still requires that wb >
wHH so that ﬁrst-best cannot be attained.
Risk-averse managers: To determine eﬀort–IC:
E[W|both work in class 2] = 2
 
p
2wHH + p(1 − p)wb +( 1− p)
2wLL
 
E[W|one works in class 1] = pwb + 2(1 − p)wLL E[W|neither works] = 2wLL




HH + 2(1 − p)(2 − p)w
2
LL
+(1 − 2p(1 − p))w
2
b − 4p












37With risk-averse managers the constraints depend on the sharing rule between managers
because this aﬀects the variance of wages. I assume that the team wage is shared equally
when they take identical actions. When they take diﬀerent actions, rather than specify one
rule, I introduce a parameter β ∈ [1
2,1]. If the wages are shared equally for all outcomes,
then β = 1
2.I fthe total wage risk is carried by just one manager, then β =1 .The two eﬀort
constraints require that ∆1a ≥ c2
p and ∆1b ≥ c2





var[W|both work] ≥ E[W|one works] − βαvar[W|one works] + 2c2 − c1





HH − 4p(1 − p)wHHwLL − 4p
2wHHwb
+(1 − β − 2p(1 − p))w
2
b +4 ( β − 1+p(2 − p))wLLwb







and E[W|both work] −
α
2
var[W|both work] ≥ 2wLL +2 c2







HH + 2(1 − p)(2 − p)w
2
LL
+(1 − 2p(1 − p))w
2
b − 4p
2wHHwb − 4(1 − p)
2wLLwb − 4p(1 − p)wHHwLL
 
Following the method of the proof of Proposition 3, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the ﬁrst-best contract to satisfy the eﬀort constraints is ∆3 ≤ ∆1a and ∆3 ≤ ∆1b, where
∆1a(εH,ε L)=2 pεH + 2(1 − p)εL
−2α(1 − p)
 
(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2










∆1b(εH,ε L)=pεH +( 2− p)εL − α(1 − p)
 
(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2














(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2







∆3 − ∆1b = x
p −
εL
p which is strictly positive when limited liability is nonbinding in ﬁrst
best, and zero otherwise. Thus, limited liability binding in ﬁrst best, so that εL = x,i sa
necessary condition for ∆3 ≤ ∆1b.I nthis case:












With limited liability binding, εH ≥ x.I fx = εL = εH, then the above is equal to c2−c1
p if
β = 1
2 and less than c2−c1
p for β>1
2.
38The next step is to identify conditions such that the nonherding constraints are satisﬁed by
the ﬁrst-best contract in this region. The two nonherding constraints are ∆2a ≥ c2−c1
δρ and
∆2b ≥ c2−c1
δρ , where the ∆2· functions are calculated as follows: (It is assumed here that risk
is shared equally between managers, even when they agree that exactly one will deviate.
This assumption only makes it more diﬃcult to satisfy nonherding–IC and thus, does not
alter the results.)
E[W|class2 & e =1 ]−
α
2
var[W|class2 & e =1 ]− 2c2 ≥
E[W|cl1,cl 2&e =1 ]−
α
2
var[W|cl1,cl 2&e =1 ]− c2 − c1






H − (1 − 4p +2 p
2 + δρ)ε
2
L + 2(1 − 2p +2 p
2 + δρ)εHεL
 






H − (1 − 4p +2 p
2 + δρ)ε
2




where ∆2 is deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 4.
E[W|class2 & e =1 ]−
α
2




var[W|class1&e =1 ]− 2c1
var[W|class1&e =1 ]− var[W|class2 & e =1 ]
=2 p(1 − p)
 
2(1 − p − p
2)ε
2
H − 2(1 − 3p + p
2)ε
2










(1 − p − p
2)ε
2
H − (1 − 3p + p
2)ε
2







∆2(εH,ε L) − αp(1 − p)(1 − ρ)(εH − εL)
2
 
Both ∆2a and ∆2b are strictly positive when x = εL = εH.T oshow that there exist parameter
values such that ﬁrst best can be achieved under cooperation it is suﬃcient to show that
there exist parameter values such that: i) in the ﬁrst-best contract εL = εH = r, where
r ≡ ψ/(α +2 ψ); ii) c2 − c1 ≤ min[1/ρ,2]δρ∆2; and iii) (from equation (24)) c2 − c1 ≤ 4(β −
1/2)αr2p(1 − p). From equation (17) in the derivation of the ﬁrst-best contract (before the
proof of Proposition 3) we know that part i) requires that c2 =2 rp(1−(1−p)αr). Given part
i), ∆2 =2 αr2.T h us, suﬃcient for parts ii) and iii) is: c2−c1 ≤ 2min[2β −1,2ρ]αr2p(1−p).
Assuming that, if only one manager works, then the manager who works takes on more than
one-half of the wage risk (β>1/2), then there do exist parameter values such that these
conditions are satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let wb ≡ wHL + wLH.
Risk-neutral managers: As shown in the proof of Proposition 5, the nonherding constraints
39are easier to satisfy with cooperation. Under cooperation, the eﬀort–IC constraint (12)
becomes:











With noncooperation wLH is optimally set to zero and wLL is optimally set to zero under both
regimes, so constraint (26) is identical to the eﬀort constraint in the noncooperative game,
constraint (12). However, because nonherding–IC requires that wb >w HH, and because
under cooperation, if one manager shirks, then the working manager will expend only c1
instead of c2, constraint (25) is harder to satisfy than constraint (12).
Risk-averse managers: The nonherding–IC constraint under noncooperation is ∆2 ≥ c2−c1
δρ ,
where ∆2 is deﬁned in equation (20) in the proof of Proposition 4. The cost of inducing
diversiﬁcation is lowered under cooperation if the following two diﬀerences are both positive:
∆2a − ∆2 =∆ 2 +2 αε
2
M (27)








α(1 − ρ)p(1 − p)(εH − εL)2
ρ
(28)
The diﬀerence in (27) is clearly positive. Also, if risk is not shared equally when managers
choose diﬀerent class types, then the second term of ∆2a will be larger, so the assumption
of equal risk sharing has no eﬀect. To determine the sign of the diﬀerence in (28), we can





− αp(1 − p)(εH − εL)








H +( p − 2)ε
2
L)+2(1 − 2p(1 − p))εHεL − (1 + ρ)p(1 − p)(εH − εL)
2.
εL − εH + αζ is strictly positive if εL ≥ εH.F o rεL − εH + αζ to be negative it is necessary
that εL <ε H and that αp(1 − p)(εH − εL)2 > c2−c1
δρ .E veni nthis case the diﬀerence in (28)
may be positive.
From the proof the proof of Proposition 4, the eﬀort–IC constraint under noncooperation
is ∆1 ≥ c2
p , where ∆1 is deﬁned in equation (19) in that proof. Continuing from the proof
of Proposition 5, if both of the following diﬀerences are strictly positive, then allowing for
cooperation lowers the cost of inducing eﬀort.











(pεH +( 1− p)εL)
2 + pε
2







=∆ 1 − 2
 













40≥ ∆1 − 2εM
 















= εL (1 − α(1 − p)εL) − εM
 




If the individual component of the noncooperative contract is signiﬁcant (εM large), and if
c2−c1 is large, then allowing for cooperation can make it more expensive to provide incentives
for exerting eﬀort. Otherwise, allowing for cooperation lowers the cost of inducing eﬀort.
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